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>## 2. Evidence that MOF’s guidance overrode corporate‑group decisions
The merger between Sakura Bank (formerly Mitsui Bank) and Sumitomo Bank is the clearest example.

>From the perspective of corporate‑group logic, such a merger should have been unthinkable.

>Yet once the MOF’s Banking Bureau instructed them to merge across *zaibatsu* boundaries, **the corporate groups had no veto power.**

>This demonstrates conclusively that corporate groups were under the MOF’s indirect control through the banking system.

https://gyazo.com/f206f5340b154a5ce5b0a79021579eea

>---

>## 3. Why Nippon Steel was able to grow: the presence of a “counter‑power” in MITI

>Nippon Steel did not belong to any specific corporate group and was therefore relatively free from MOF control.

>However, because banks—ultimately under MOF influence—controlled its financing, Nippon Steel should have been at a disadvantage.

>Yet Nippon Steel grew to **three times the size of Sumitomo Metal Industries**, which enjoyed full *zaibatsu* backing.

>This was possible because:

>- **Nippon Steel had the support of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now METI).**
>- **MITI possessed enormous regulatory authority over plant‑location approvals and environmental regulations affecting corporate‑group companies.**

>Thus, even banks backed by the MOF could not easily oppose Nippon Steel.

>Nippon Steel became:

>**the only major corporation that survived by leveraging the power balance between MOF and MITI.**

https://gyazo.com/3f2616431951dc8a67eecb739e6dbdff

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